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RESUMEN
En este artículo me centro en el concepto de hábito en la filosofía de Kant. En 
primer lugar, me enfoco en las críticas que él delinea contra Gewohnheit en su 
filosofía epistemológica y moral. En particular, el hábito es visto como ausencia 
de libertad moral. Esta conclusión es bastante diferente a la posición expresada 
por Kant en su Antropología en sentido pragmático y en la última parte de El con-
flicto de las facultades. Tras profundizar sobre los diferentes términos referidos 
al campo conceptual del hábito, me concentro en la relación entre Gewohnheit y 
deseo: de hecho, Kant reconoció que el hábito no es una mera repetición de un 
acto, sino, más precisamente, es el deseo de repetición. Es por esto que no está 
estrictamente ligado al mundo determinista y no se refiere a máquinas: solo los 
seres vivos podrían tener hábitos. De esta forma, es posible comprender su rol 
en el tema de la salud: en la reflexión sobre dietética, el hábito es particular-
mente útil. La última parte del artículo está consagrada a la nueva perspectiva 
en la filosofía política kantiana abierta por esta visión positiva de este concepto.
Palabras clave: Kant, hábitos, vida, filosofía política moderna, libertad.
ABSTRACT
In this article I focus on the concept of habit in Kant’s philosophy. First of all, 
I concentrate on the criticisms he delineates against Gewohnheit in his episte-
mological and moral philosophy. In particular, habit is seen as absence of moral 
freedom. This conclusion is pretty different from Kant’s position expressed in 
his Anthropology From the Pragmatic Point of View and in the last part of the 
Conflict of the Faculties. After a deep insight on the different terms referred to 
the conceptual field of habit, I focus on the relation between Gewohnheit and 
desire: in fact, Kant recognized that habit is not the mere repetition of an act, 
but more precisely it is the desire of repetition. That is why it is not strictly bon-
ded to the deterministic world and it does not refer to machines: only the living 
beings may have habits. This way, it is possible to understand its role within the 
theme of health: in the reflections on dietetics, habit is particularly useful. The 
last part of the article is devoted to the new perspective on Kantian political 
philosophy opened by this positive view on this concept.
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1. Introduction
Among the modern philosophers that faced the topic 
of habit, Kant is probably the one who confronted it 
with the biggest hostility, considering it as a nega-
tion of freedom and as an automatism that deter-
mines the will, subtracting it from the dominion of 
practical reason.1 Coherently, with the dualism that characterizes his who-
le philosophy, we will see that Kant generally places freedom (intended as 
autonomy from experience, as not repeatable or imitable radical diff erence 
from everyday acting) on one side and the mechanical repetition of the 
identical and of the necessary in the Angewohnheit on the other. However, 
sometimes the opposition between active freedom and the automatism of 
habit, even if present among Kant’s texts, gets less radical, opening (even 
not too timidly) to the possibility that a particular interpretation of habit 
could dissolve the distance between the realm of (moral) freedom and the 
realm of mechanical (and natural) necessity. As we will see, such possibi-
lity is offered by the relation between life and habit: in fact, when Kant 
analyses the vital force (Lebenskraft), the active aspect of habit arises, pre-
venting its reduction into a mechanical automatism.
1 Tony Bennet argues that the Kantian construction influenced the negative view of habit typi-
cal of the 19th and 20th centuries. See Tony Bennett, Francis Dodsworth, Greg Noble, Mary 
Poovey, and Megan Watkins. “Habit and Habituation: Governance and the Social”, Body & 
Society, Vol. 19, Nº. 2-3, 2013, pp. 3-29, in particular p. 7.
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2. Habit in Kantian Science and Moral
According to Kant, habit is a form of coercion on the subject, both 
in the practical and in the cognitive sphere. In both cases, however, 
it implicates only a subjective and not an objective necessity, because 
on it, it is not possible to build neither a science nor a universal valid 
moral. The subjective necessity implied by habit is at the centre of the 
dialogue that Kant establishes with Hume among the paragraphs con-
cerning nature of causality in his Critique of Pure Reason. According to 
the Scottish philosopher, the causal connection is not intrinsic to the 
objects, but is derived from the natural human inclination to create 
habits that leads people to attend, after having experienced a sequence 
of phenomena, that this sequence will necessarily repeat.2 However, 
this necessity is not fully justified and can always be denied by an un-
expected sequence of experiences.
Consistent with the sceptical tradition to which Hume oft refers 
to,3 representations – and, therefore, also causality – are recognized 
as products of the subject, and the necessity we associate to some 
of them is the result of the habitual nature of the subject, which 
leads him to expect that the future will be a repetition4 of the past. 
According to Kant, this perspective, concentrated on the nature of the 
human being, reduces the causal link to a subjective necessity.5 The 
German philosopher does not avoid the confrontation with Hume, 
but rather fully admits the sceptical doubt. But this is entrusted with 
a limited task within philosophy,6 in the sense that it must allow 
2 See David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
2000, pp. 58-61; David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007, 
Vol. I, pp. 61-74.
3 The importance of scepticism in the formulation of the problem of representation is central 
in Gianni Paganini. Skepsis. Le débat des modernes sur le scepticisme. Paris, Vrin, 2008. 
For a detailed study on modern scepticism, I refer to the classic: Richard Henry Popkin. 
History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979. 
See also Popkin’s shorter text: “Scepticism”, in Knud Haakonssen. The Cambridge History 
of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, Vol. 1, 
pp. 426-450.
4 The repetition to which Hume refers here is a repetition of analogies and not of identities. 
For textual references and critical literature on this point, may I be allowed to refer to my text: 
Giulia Valpione. “Politics Without a Subject: David Hume on General Rules”, Ipseitas, Vol. 3, 
Nº. 2, 2017, pp. 177-196.
5 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1998, p. 138.
6 “And thus the skeptic is the taskmaster of the dogmatic sophist for a healthy critique of the 
understanding and of reason itself. […] Thus the skeptical procedure is not, to be sure, itself 
satisfying for questions of reason, but it is nevertheless preparatory for arousing its caution 
and showing it fundamental means for securing it in its rightful possession” (Immanuel Kant. 
Critic of Pure Reason, p. 658; se also pp. 652-658).
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further consideration to criticism7 and metaphysics,8 which proceeds 
in a dogmatic way.9 Kant’s transcendental philosophy can be read as 
an attempt to demonstrate both the possibility of objective knowledge 
and the objective necessity of causality to get over the sceptical crisis. 
Briefly, through the deduction of the categories,10 Kant demonstrates 
that, in order to make an experience possible, there has to be a priori 
concepts (including causality) linked to intuitive a priori forms. The 
transcendental project fully admits the sceptical doubt that prevents us 
from asserting with certainty the correspondence between our experi-
ence and the things as they are in themselves (that is, from asserting 
that a causal link exists outside our representations), but this does not 
prevent the possibility of an objectivity in knowledge. This objectivity 
rests on the demonstration of the necessity of categories to have an 
experience of any kind; that is, on the proof that, in order to have an 
experience, there must be a universally valid ‘structure’ made by a priori 
forms. In other words, Kant accepts Hume’s challenge and admits that, 
indeed, the necessity which characterizes causal representations is 
present in the subject and not in the things in themselves (or, better, 
we cannot know if it is present also in the things in themselves). But, 
the transcendental approach allows us to state that, if an object is to be 
given (for a subject), then this object must be subordinated to the table 
of categories and to an a priori form of intuition. Thus, the necessity of 
the causality, no longer derives from the habitualness of man, but from 
the transcendental structure of the subject, which is self-grounded,11 
and is not affected in any way by experience.12
7 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 654.
8 “Thus all pure a priori cognition […] constitutes a special unity, and metaphysics is that phi-
losophy which is to present that cognition in this systematic unity” (Immanuel Kant. Critique of 
Pure Reason…, p. 698). “This name [metaphysics] can also be given to all of pure philosophy 
including the critique, in order to comprehend the investigation of everything that can be cog-
nized a priori as well as the presentation of that which constitutes a system of pure philosophi-
cal cognition of this kind” (Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 696).
9 It should be remembered that dogmatic method is different from dogmatism: “Criticism is 
not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in its pure cognition as science (for science 
must always be dogmatic, i.e., it must prove its conclusions strictly a priori from secure princi-
ples); rather, it is opposed only to dogmatism […]. Dogmatism is therefore the dogmatic pro-
cedure of pure reason, without an antecedent critique of its own capacity.” (Immanuel Kant. 
Critique of Pure Reason, p. 119).
10 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 219-266.
11 See Gerhard Funke. “Gewohnheit”, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, Nº. 3, 1958, pp. 9-606, 
in particular 490-493.
12 “I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather 
with our a priori concepts of objects in general” (Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 
133). According to Clare Carlisle (On Habit. London, Routledge, 2014, p. 64), this approach is 
opposed to that of Deleuze, who theorizes a habitual subject whose experience is conditioned 
by a subjectivity that is formed and emerges through the experience itself.
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Of course, experience can lead to the development of a posteriori 
concepts with which the objects of experience are further elaborated, 
but the emergence of those concepts from the subject’s habitual abili-
ties (including habit itself ) cannot be scientifically analysed in a proper 
sense. Objectivity is possible, despite scepticism, because the philoso-
pher identifies the formal conditions of possibility of experience (con-
ditions that the object necessarily respects), while habit is subjective 
and not translatable in terms of intuitive, intellectual, or rational elabo-
rations.13 It is but a condition subjected to contingency and it cannot 
lead to a dogmatic: in Kantian philosophy, knowledge is a set of repre-
sentations, made by an a priori transcendental form and an a posteriori 
content. Thus, it is not possible, to develop a metaphysics of habit.14
The Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View is particularly 
clear in this regard: habits are conditioned by the situations in which 
every individual is living, making it impossible to achieve the formal 
criteria required for a scientific knowledge about them.15 So, the in-
terpretation that reads the Anthropology (Kant’s text that, above all 
the others, addresses the concept of habit) as the answer to the ques-
tion that the German philosopher poses since the beginning of his 
philosophical reflection (“Was ist der Mensch?”)16 is legitimate, but it 
is undeniable that for him anthropology cannot be a science, and will 
always remain pragmatic.17 Therefore, habit not only cannot lead to 
objectivity, but cannot even be the object of a universal science, as it is 
closely linked to subjective necessity.
The attempt to marginalize the importance of habit is evident even 
in Kant’s reflections about morality. Here, Kant investigates the pos-
sibility of freedom, as a condition of the moral law understood as an 
a priori law that benefits of objective necessity.18 It is in this particular 
regard that, once again, habit is considered a subjective necessity. The 
moral law is an imperative, a rule characterized by duty and is valid for 
the will of every rational being.19 In this case, the determining motive 
13 See Gerhard Funke. “Gewohnheit”, p. 493.
14 Contrary to the well-known example of Ravaisson.
15 See Immanuel Kant. “Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View”, in Anthropology, 
History and Education. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 233.
16 See Michel Foucault. Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology. Los Angeles, Semiotext(e), 
2008, pp. 76-86. It is particularly significant that the purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason is 
to establish the extension of practical reason without any consideration for the human nature: 
this seems to imply that habit is, in reality, the constitutive element of the human being.
17 In this regard, see Kant’s Preface to Anthropology…, pp. 231-233.
18 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 146-147.
19 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Practical Reason..., p. 153.
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of the will consists in the form of the law and not in its matter: a form 
that is not the object of the senses that therefore does not belong to the 
world of phenomena, and thus is independent from causality. The mor-
al law, then, has an objective necessity for the will, but at the same time 
is a rule that permits the will to be free.20 Habit, on the other hand, is 
the determining motive of the will through the matter of a rule and not 
through the form: it is determined by empirical conditions, falls within 
the sphere of phenomena, and, therefore, is not a sign of freedom.
3. The Automatism of Habit:  
Between Monotony and Cogency
Before a further inquiry on the Kantian reflections on habit, it is nec-
essary to make some terminological clarifications, thanks to two dif-
ferent passages in the Anthropology. In the first, the topic is considered 
from the point of view of the influence of habit on the will; in the sec-
ond, habit is analysed with particular attention to its link to desire.21 In 
the first, we can find the relevant differentiation between promptitudo, 
habitus, and assuetudo. The promptitudo indicates the progressive ease in 
performing an action, thanks to its repetition. This concept concerns, 
for example, the exercises of an athlete, who increases his or her capac-
ity and potentiality from repeated training, and can be summarized 
with the formula: “I can, if I want to”.22 Strictly speaking though, 
what we commonly consider habit actually concerns habitus and as-
suetudo, since the will is also influenced. In fact, it is certainly possible 
to claim to have the habit of doing something that we voluntarily do, 
and which is easier for us to accomplish over time. But it is when habit 
affects our will, or when it manifests itself involuntarily, that it further 
forges our way of being, our nature, forcing us in a mechanical way, 
almost like instinct.
Habitus is a skill in doing something, but it also implies a degree 
of will acquired through repeated use of our ability and can be sum-
marized to “I choose this, because duty commands it”.23 However, it 
does not lead to a moral behaviour precisely because this duty is not 
20 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Practical Reason..., p. 162.
21 Kant distinguishes two kinds of faculties of desire: the first is the lower and sensible one. 
The second is the higher and is driven by reason according to concepts; this consists in 
the will. See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Practical Reason..., p. 156. Immanuel Kant. The 
Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy…, pp. 374-375.
22 Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 259.
23 Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 259.
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rational and a priori, but has arisen from the continuous repetition in 
the past that also extends into the present. Following the example of 
the athlete, he or she contracts a habitus not only if his or her ability 
increases over time, but rather if there is a desire to repeat the exercise 
with a certain cogency and not as a simple desire to accomplish the 
goal (to improve the athletic results). Habitus is a form of necessity 
to repeat the act as such. Discussing this nuance of habit, Kant takes 
position starkly for its exclusion from the moral realm. Here emerges 
the Protestant doctrine that claimed – contrary to the idea sustained 
by the Catholic Church, according to which the divine grace can be 
possessed by the Christian in the form of a habitus –24 that grace is 
something that cannot be possessed, following Luther’s interpretation 
of the Letter to the Romans written by Paul of Tarsus.25 Grace must be 
given every time as a gift from God to the human soul that promptly 
loses it again and again.26 Likewise, Kant categorically rejects the idea 
that virtue consists in the Fertigkeit to perform free actions, since mo-
rality must never become a habit (Gewohnheit): it must always be real-
ized in a new and original way.27
The pressure exerted on will through repetitions of an action 
reaches, however, the apex in the assuetudo (Angewohnheit): the nec-
essary compulsion (Nötigung), the physical constraint inside the 
individual that pushes him to behave exactly as he or she did in the 
past.28 The idea of habit as second nature is particularly evident here. 
The Angewohnheit is in fact comparable to instincts, as it manifests 
the same automaticity, but she does not lead to ‘natural’, but rather to 
‘artificial’ instincts, acquired in the condition in which the individual is 
living. She is therefore “another nature”,29 that manifests in habit: she 
is a “second nature”.30
Angewohnheiten are the actions that we continue to reproduce 
involuntarily after long conscious repetitions, as, for example, the 
necessity for a lawyer to continue to touch a string when he speaks 
24 See Clare Carlisle. On Habit, pp. 130-137.
25 See Clare Carlisle. On Habit, p. 118. For Lutheran criticism of habitus, I follow Carlisle’s 
suggestion, provided in the text just cited: see Bernhard Lohse. Martin Luther’s Theology Its 
Historical and Systematic Development. Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 2006.
26 See Clare Carlisle. “The Question of Habit in Theology and Philosophy: From Hexis to 
Plasticity”, Body & Society, Vol. 19, Nº. 2-3, 2013, pp. 30-57.
27 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 259.
28 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 261. The English translation of the Kantian text is 
flawed, as it translates both Gewohnheit and Angewohnheit with “habit”.
29 Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 261.
30 Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 233. Italics added.
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in public,31 or, in the cognitive field, the association of some repre-
sentations that usually occur together or in succession.32 Or, again, 
it is the case of the movements that we do as we sleep: in Kant’s 
interpretation, they are the involuntary continuation of the muscular 
contractions that are needed during the day to move our body. Even 
if these motions could denote the presence of a kind of attention 
by the subject, this is very feeble, to the point that such movements 
can be performed completely unintentionally or in a state of uncon-
sciousness.33 The coercion exercised by the Angewohnheit is the pin-
nacle of the possible influence of habit on the human being. In this 
case, this coercion overshadows the role of will and reason when we 
act. If desire and rationality are the sign of human’s freedom, habit 
(and, in particular, the Angewohnheit) testifies, according to Kant, its 
absence. It deteriorates the human being to an automaton,34 inas-
much as it provokes the necessity of always conforming to an action 
that has been frequently repeated,35 like a machine built to perform 
the same action continually. In the image sketched here, habit, with 
its different degrees of constraint on the individual, is therefore con-
fined within the realm of nature, as opposed to the realm of freedom. 
Like the laws of nature, or like instincts, habits continue to recur in a 
straight monotony.
Uniformity is the main characteristic of consuetudo (Gewohntwerden), 
and testifies to what extents, at least up to here, habit is the recurrence 
of the equal, according to Kant. ‘Being accustomed’ (consuetudo) is a 
state of passivity of the subject, who, after having perceived the same 
sensation for a long time, will no longer bring attention to it, reaching 
a total atony of sensations.36 Sensitive impressions are objects of our 
attention only because of a difference (i.e. the interruption of an iden-
tity), in other words because of a contrast with other sensations, or be-
cause of the introduction of a change or the increase in the intensity of 
31 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 284.
32 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, pp. 285-286. Kant evidently has here Hume’s expla-
nation of causality as polemical objective.
33 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 298. The same happens with the habit, con-
tracted during the day and prolonged in sleep, to breathe with closed mouth. See Immanuel 
Kant. The Conflict of the Faculties, in Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, p. 324.
34 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 261. In fact, habit transforms virtue into a mecha-
nism. See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 259.
35 “If it is a habit [Angewohnheit] (assuetudo), that is, a uniformity in action that has become a 
necessity through frequent repetition, it is not one that proceeds from freedom, and therefore 
not a moral aptitude” (Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals..., p. 535).
36 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 261; see also p. 274.
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an impression.37 It is a frequent experience that a sensitive stimulation, 
if constantly repeated over time, seems to fade away, until it almost 
disappears, without drawing our attention anymore.
The idea that habit may be only an automatic index of passivity 
is not easily defensible. The ‘active’ aspect of habit was examined in 
depth in France at almost the same time as the appearance of Kant’s 
Critiques, developing a line of research38 that better develops the 
complexity of the topic. Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy had already 
noted the diversity, or even the opposition, among the different ef-
fects of habit, which on one hand facilitates the expression of will, 
but on the other leads to automatic gestures.39 Bichat, in Recherches 
physiologiques sur la vie et la mort (1800), dedicates a dozen of pages to 
that concept and sketches out its ‘double’ peculiarity,40 later developed 
also by Maine de Biran and Ravaisson.41 According to Bichat, habit 
softens the intensity of a sensation, but at the same time perfects the 
judgement we can formulate about it. Habit is a two-faced Janus that 
increases and diminishes the human faculties: the ability of judge-
ment, according to Bichat, is refined, but the sensibility is weakened.42 
These two aspects constitute the duplicity of habit – a “double law of 
habit”, formulated by Ravaisson in 1838 –43 investigated by Maine de 
Biran,44 for whom repetition leads not only to a weakening of impres-
sions, but also to a refinement of perceptions,45 as well as to improve-
ments in voluntary acts.46 In fact, through the repetition of an act over 
37 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 273.
38 Ravaisson had already identified the presence of such a tradition. It should be remembered 
that his text on habit is subtitled: La philosophie en France au XIX siècle.
39 See Dominique Janicaud. “L’habitude selon Ravaisson et Maine de Biran: d’après ‘De 
l’habitude’ et l’ ‘Influence de l’habitude sur la faculté de penser’”, Revue philosophique de la 
France et de l’Étranger, Nº. 158, 1968, pp. 65-87, in particular p. 68.
40 See Xavier Bichat. Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort. Paris, V. Masson, 1852, 
pp. 30-37 (available at the link: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6275881c).
41 See Marco Piazza. L’antagonista necessario. La filosofia francese dell’abitudine da 
Montaigne a Deleuze. Milano-Udine, Mimesis, 2015, p. 141. On p. 145, Piazza emphasizes 
that Biran nevertheless developed his theory of habit independently of Bichat, as he read his 
Recherches only in 1802, a year after de Biran’s publication: Influence de l’habitude sur la 
faculté de penser. Paris, Henrichs, 1802 (available at the link: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/
btv1b8618395t).
42 “Plus nous voyons un objet, moins nous sommes sensibles à ce qu’il a de pénible ou 
d’agréable, et mieux nous en jugeons tous les attributs” (Xavier Bichat. Recherches…, p. 30).
43 See Jean-Gaspard-Félix Ravaisson-Mollien. De l’habitude. La philosophie en France au XIX 
siècle. Paris, Fayard, 1984, p. 18.
44 “Les résultats de l’habitude se partageront entre l’affaiblissement, d’un côté, la persistance 
ou le progrès, de l’autre” (Maine de Biran. Influence de l’habitude…, p. 108).
45 This is the theme of the first two chapters of Biran’s text: Influence de l’habitude…, pp. 87-149.
46 “Tout mouvement volontaire, fréquemment répété, devient de plus en plus facile, prompt et 
précis” (Maine de Biran. Influence de l’habitude…, p. 223).
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time, we acquire greater ease and familiarity in accomplishing it: less 
attention and less effort is required in order to improve the perfor-
mance; therefore the voluntary activity is facilitated. On the other 
side, however, Maine de Biran also recognizes that the reduction of 
the effort required to perform the same act over time implies (as Kant 
had already seen) that habit leads to actions accomplished in an un-
conscious and mechanical way. The first side implies a positive evalu-
ation of habit, since it increases the potentiality of the subject that 
contracts the habit. But the second has a negative nuance, as it pre-
supposes the absence of will and of conscience. With an example, the 
habit of smoking is a form of necessity that imposes the subject to act 
automatically, preventing the possibility of an intervention that might 
occur only with great effort. On the contrary, the habit of walking all 
day long brings the improvement of our physical structure as a result, 
as well as our ability to manage the succession of steps, of movements 
of the arms, even in difficult situations. In this case, habit provokes 
an increase in the subject’s potential, enlarging its possibilities and its 
ability to reach increasingly complex objectives. In short, habit can 
be seen as an active instance, as an actualization of a power that is 
reflected by the increase of the expressions of potentiality itself.47 At 
the same time, however, it is also an indicator of passivity, and Kant 
seems to concentrate only on this last aspect. In his critique of the 
Angewohnheit, he seems to have taken in consideration only one side 
of the two-faced Janus.
4. The Force of Habit: The Desire of Living Beings
For Kant, habit is, as far as we have seen, a mechanical repetition of 
actions that does not possess in itself any force. The invariability of 
any Angewohnheit corresponds to Kant’s formulation of the principle 
of inertia for which matter persists in its condition unless there are 
external causes that force it to change its state.48 According to Kant, 
47 The reference here is obviously to the Aristotelian doctrine of hexis. Briefly, and following 
Pierre Rodrigo’s analyses, in Aristotle hexis is an intermediary between act and power. This 
means that the act, once attained, does not completely disappear, but leaves its trace on 
power, enriching it. In other words: in hexis, the actualizations of power lead to better and” 
better practices. See Pierre Rodrigo. “La dynamique de l’hexis chez Aristote. L’état, la tenue et 
la limite”, Alter, Nº. 12, 2004, pp. 11-26.
48 See Immanuel Kant. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, in Theoretical 
Philosophy after 1781. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 251-252. This con-
firms the hypothesis that the interpretation of the habit conditions (and is conditioned in turn) 
the interpretation of matter (Alexandra Renault. “L’habitude chez Bergson: une esquisse du 
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inertia is not a force (Bestreben) which tends to self-preservation.49 
On the contrary, it consists in the passive persistence of a condi-
tion.50 In the same way, no impulse, force, or power can be associ-
ated with habit: it is inertial matter, simple monotony. The limitation 
of habit to the idea of an inertial identity as simple automation 
without force can only conflict with the concept of freedom as self-
determination that interrupts and interferes, as a radical difference 
within the monotony of customs. This difference follows from the 
leap necessary to move from being a person who only has a spe-
cific temperament or a habitual disposition, to becoming a person 
of character, who has “that property of the will by which the subject 
binds him to define practical principles that he has prescribed to 
himself irrevocably by his own reason”.51 Temperament is a natural 
disposition52 and the habitual disposition is given by mere occasional 
causes:53 both reduce the human being to a determined state without 
freedom. There is no mediation between these two and the tenacity 
of principles:54 the firmness of character can be produced by the sub-
ject only with an explosion.55
The autonomy of a person who has character consists in the 
self-imposition of behaviour cohesive with a principle of conduct 
(Lebenswandel),56 which must not depend on habitual condition. He 
or she is free, original,57 the incarnation of a difference. The adherence 
to this principle cannot be accomplished by imitation (or, even worse, 
by fashion, Mode).58 The originality of character, given by avoiding any 
external influence (be it culture or nature), is realized in a non-gradual 
way, it is given all at once;59 it is a radical transformation that involves 
a vow to one’s self,60 interrupting the atony of habitual repetitions that 
reduce the subject to passivity. Moreover, the character, thanks to his 
concept phénoménologique de Stiftung?”, Alter, Nº. 12, 2004, pp. 79-103, in particular p. 86).
49 In contrast to Leibniz’ hypothesis. See Max Jammer. Concepts of Force: A Study in the 
Foundations of Dynamics. New York, Dover, 1999, pp. 160-161.
50 We have to wait at least until the revaluation made by Schelling and the German 
Romanticism of the dynamics in order to have a different interpretation.
51 Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, pp. 389-390.
52 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 384.
53 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 384.
54 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 392.
55 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 392.
56 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 392.
57 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 390.
58 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 391.
59 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 390.
60 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 392.
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absolute self-determination, cannot but coincide with the assumption 
of the moral law as its own practical principle; freedom is thus pro-
duced as an interruption and radical difference. 
It would be possible61 to trace here the Kantian dualism which sees on 
one hand the absence of strength and the mechanical reproduction of the 
Angewohnheit, and, on the other, freedom; but this interpretation is limit-
ing. Not everything that isn’t inertial is a sign of freedom. Between the 
machine (automatism) and freedom (actions done only for moral duty), 
there is life. Life is also the force of empirically conditioned self-determi-
nation. It is not a machine or simple inertia, so as it is not free in itself, as 
Kant clearly states in Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, 
immediately after having refused the idea of inertia as force:
The inertia of matter is, and means, nothing else than its lifelessness, as 
matter in itself. Life is the faculty of a substance to determine itself to act 
from an internal principle, of a finite substance to change, and of a material 
substance [to determine itself] to motion or rest, as change of its state. Now 
we know no other internal principle in a substance for changing its state 
except desiring.62
And so, life is the opposite of inertia, and its force is desire. “Life 
is the faculty of a being to act in accordance with laws of the fac-
ulty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen)”,63 wrote Kant in the Critique of 
Practical Reason. The Begierde, “self-determination of a subject’s power 
through the representation of something in the future as an effect 
of this representation”,64 is not always sign of freedom, because she 
can be sensitive and determined by pleasure.65 Freedom is a rule that 
determines a priori the will to respect the form of its maxims,66 and 
is therefore independent from any matter of the law.67 Desire, on the 
61 This is for example Funke’s interpretation: Gerhard Funke. “Gewohnheit”, pp. 479-494; 
likewise: Gerhard Funke. Gewohnheit, in Joachim Ritter (ed.): Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie. Basel-Stuttgart, Schwage & Co., 1974, Vol. 3, pp. 597-616, in particular pp. 609-
610. See also: Clare Carlisle. On Habit, and Clare Carlisle. “Between Freedom and Necessity: 
Félix Ravaisson on Habit and the Moral Life”, Inquiry, Vol. 53, Nº. 2, 2010, pp. 123-145.
62 Immanuel Kant. Metaphysical Foundations…, pp. 251-252. See also: Immanuel Kant. 
Critique of the Power of Judgment. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 265.
63 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Practical Reason..., p. 144. See also: “The faculty of desire is 
the faculty to be, by means of one’s representations, the cause of the objects of these repre-
sentations. The faculty of a being to act in accordance with its representations is called Life” 
(Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals…, p. 373).
64 Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 353.
65 See Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals…, p. 374.
66 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Practical Reason..., p. 162.
67 “Thus a practical precept that brings with it a material (hence empirical) condition must 
never be reckoned a practical life […]. Thus the matter of the maxim can indeed remain, but 
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other hand, can be sensitive and can then be conditioned by the con-
text, because it does not derive from a rational a priori law, but depends 
on its object, which causes a feeling of pleasure. An action is free if it’s 
done for duty, not for habit,68 or for Lust or Unlust.
Habits are not a simple series of repeated actions: an action 
does not become habitual until there is a desire for repetition. The 
Begierde here is the force or the potentiality that causes the recur-
rence of an action, a form of coaction (more or less cogent), an im-
pulse to repetition. The word impulse (Trieb) is not accidental here, 
because, in this case, desire is instinct69 (to which Kant associates the 
concept of impulse).70 However, since Angewohnheit is an instinct 
of ‘second level’ –not linked to the first but to the second nature –,71 
she is in fact one of the possible expressions of Begehrungsvermögen. 
Then, even if habit is not consciously done for purpose, it has some-
thing to do with desire.
The Begierde also urges us to will the repetition of this action, as in 
the case of propensity (Hang) and inclination (Neigung). Propensity is 
the subjective possibility that a certain desire arises.72 In other words, it 
is the potentiality that manifests itself in the desire to repeat an action. 
Propensity is therefore also the latency of a possible habit. The fact 
that habit is not only conditioned by the will, but that it also condi-
tions it in turn, is particularly evident in the case of inclination, which 
is a form of Gewohnheit, or rather a “habitual sensible desire”.73 
Machines do not have habits because habit is not simply repeti-
tion of an act, but rather the potentiality and desire that this may 
be accomplished again, in a tendency that reconciles the passivity 
it must not be the condition of the maxim since the maxim would then not be fit for a law” 
(Immanuel Kant. Critique of Practical Reason..., p. 167).
68 See Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals..., p. 537.
69 Remember that for Kant instinct is the necessitation (Nötigung) of the faculty of desire to 
take possession of an object even before knowing it. See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, 
p. 367.
70 Between propensity (Hang), which “is actually only the predisposition to desire an enjoy-
ment which, when the subject has experienced it, arouses inclination into it” (Immanuel Kant. 
Religion Between the Boundaries of Pure Reason, in Religion and Rational Theology, p. 76), 
and inclination “there is yet instinct. It is a felt need to do or enjoy something to which we still 
do not have a concept (such as the drive in animals to build [Kunsttrieb] or the drive [Trieb] to 
sex” (Immanuel Kant. Religion Between the Boundaries…, p. 77).
71 In Angewohnheit “the animal in the human being jumps out far too much, and because 
here one is led instinctively by the rule of habituation (Angewohnheit), exactly like another 
(non-human) nature” (Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 261).
72 “By propensity (Hange) (propensio) I understand the subjective ground of the possibility of 
an inclination (habitual desire, concupiscentia), insofar as this possibility is contingent for hu-
manity in general” (Immanuel Kant. Religion Between the Boundaries…, p. 76).
73 Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 353.
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of an automatic repetition with the activity of a vital impulse that 
constantly pushes towards this repetition. Habit is a habit of desire, 
not mere reiteration of the act, as Kant initially sustains. Comparing 
habit to the proceeding of a machine, implicates the ignorance of 
its nature. It is linked to the Begehrungsvermögen. It is a self-deter-
mining force, and the machineries are “mere instruments of external 
moving forces”.74
As the German Romantics pointed out,75 the straight duality in 
Kantian philosophy between machine and freedom allows to pass from 
one realm to the other only through a salto mortale.76 In some pas-
sages, however, Kant leaves open the hypothesis of a middle way in the 
crossroad that separate repetition of identity – a repetition deprived of 
any force, as in the machine – from the radical difference, from the ex-
plosive force due to freedom. In those sections, the importance of ha-
bit emerges together with the recognition of its plasticity: habit cannot 
be seen only as a machine and as an automatism. It is also a kind of 
desire, a force that tends to its own determination (even if this is not 
free and rational). Namely, it is the Bestreben, which is not possessed by 
machines or by inertial matter, but rather by the living beings. When 
Kant deals with life, and, in particular, when he considers it as desire,77 
manages to go beyond that dualism that otherwise prevents him from 
dealing and analysing in depth the concept of habit.
Habit is not opposite to life, despite its proximity to the operations 
of automata. This is evident for example in the Kantian texts dedicated 
to dietetics, in which, even the Angewohnungen (that had been criti-
cized for being independent from consciousness) are considered useful 
for keeping the human being alive. This is the case, for example, of 
movements involuntarily performed during sleep by muscles. Recalling 
74 Immanuel Kant. “Metaphysical Foundations…”, p. 242.
75 For example, Friedrich Schlegel in his Jenenser lessons Transzendentalphilosophie. See 
Friedrich Schlegel. Transzendentalphilosophie. Hamburg, Meiner, 1991, p. 50.
76 This expression has been used by Friedrich Schlegel to describe the difficulty to over-
lap the duality in Jacobi’s philosophy (see Friedrich Schlegel. Jacobis Woldemar, in Hans 
Eichner [ed.]: Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe. München, Schöningh, 1967, Vol. 2, 
pp. 57-77, in particular p. 77), but it could be applied also in case of Kant.
77 Although in the Critique of Judgment Kant coined the famous definition of an organized 
product (“An organized product of nature is that in which everything is an end and reciprocally 
a means as well”; Immanuel Kant. Critique of the Power of Judgment, pp. 247-248), it should 
be emphasized that ‘life’ and ‘organism’ are not perfectly comparable concepts, even tho-
ugh life is only known in organisms (“There must therefore be a circle in the explanation if one 
would derive the purposiveness of nature in organized beings from the life of matter but in turn 
is not acquainted with this life otherwise than in organized beings, and thus cannot form any 
concept of its possibility without experience of them”; Immanuel Kant. Critique of the Power of 
Judgement, pp. 265-266).
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the physiological theories of Haller78 and John Brown,79 Kant de-
scribes life as the succession of muscle contractions interrupted by 
their distension: the moment in which this sequence would stop, blood 
circulation would be interrupted, causing the death of the individual.80 
Then, even if habit proceeds without our awareness, the equivalence 
initially posed by Kant between Gewohnheit and machine (under-
standing this as the absence of life) must be modified: the example 
described shows that habit is in fact essential to life itself.
The shift from the consideration of habit as a deplorable element 
– something that reduces the human being into a machinery – to the 
recognition that habit is necessary to perpetuate the life of individuals, 
is due to the admission that Gewohnheit is actually a force and, there-
fore, is not simply an inertial automatism. It is a form of desire to push 
the subject towards the habitual actions that does not intervene from 
the outside as in the case of machines, which in fact need an external 
impulse to move their motor.
5. The Rhythm of Habit
In some passages of his texts, Kant seems to recognize that habit is 
not a rigid inertial repetition of an identity. Certainly, it resists change 
because, for example, it leads to continue in sleep the typical muscular 
contractions of waking activity. Under another perspective, however, 
the contractions of the sleeper’s muscles interrupt (and do not cor-
roborate) the dead identity. In other words, thanks to the continuation 
of the binary rhythm of contraction-relaxation that characterizes life, 
they counteract the absence of motions that in sleep can lead the in-
dividual to death. Moreover, it is not a mechanical repetition, as this is 
the recurrence of an effect of external stimuli that must be continually 
reintroduced. In automatons, repetition is the succession of interrupted 
stimuli: after each stimulus, there is a pause, wherein repetitions and 
stimuli are absent. On the contrary, in the case of habit, it would be a 
mistake to separate the act (the contraction, in this example) from the 
78 Von Haller, in his Elementa physiologiae corporis humani, drew the parallelism between 
the relationships of irritability (Reizbarkeit) and sensitivity on one side and muscles and nerves 
on the other. In particular, muscle contraction is due to stimulation (Reizung). For further infor-
mation: Kurt Danziger. “Reiz und Reaktion”, in Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer, and Rudolf 
Eisler (eds.): Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Darmstadt Wiss. Buchges. 1992, Vol. 
8, pp. 554-567.
79 More precisely, in the case of Brown, it concerns the succession of excitement and reco-
very. See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 357.
80 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 298.
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condition in which this act is only potential and latent. To understand 
what it means to contract a habit, we must consider not only the ac-
tion, but also the force which leads to it. For this reason, Gewohnheit 
problematizes the binarity not only of necessity and freedom, but also 
of power and act.81 In fact, when Kant relates habit and desire, he must 
admit that habit is not simply constituted by the act that is repeated 
or by the effective use of a force that exhales and must be reintroduced 
every time, as if the habitual repetitions were the discrete recur of 
unrelated actions.82 Habit is instead an active maintenance of power 
itself, an increase in the (conscious or not) desire that this power might 
be effective. In Aristotelian terms, it is “second power”.83 Angewohnheit 
(and, more generally, Gewohnheit) is a self-determining force consist-
ing of the rhythmic succession of contraction and relaxation. It would 
be a mistake to separate these two phases: habit, health, and life con-
sist of their interaction. 
In the initial explanations of Angewohnheit, Kant disregards it 
considering it as an automatism, not only because he does not contem-
plate the fact that she is the result of a force (the Begehrungsvermögen), 
but also (or, rather, consequently) because he does not consider the 
pauses between the different repetitions of the act as an integral part 
of habit itself.84 This interpretation changes when the object of his re-
flection is the health of a human body. In fact, health is the succession 
of the presence-absence of stimuli, and through this concept, Kant 
can consider the moments in which the habit is not manifested as a 
latency of the habit itself and not as its absence tout court.
Habit is linked to life, in Kant’s philosophy, because life is the 
tendency towards the rhythm of contractions and distensions, whose 
relationship determines the vitality of the individual.85 This position 
allows to overcome the radical duality of freedom (as an explosive dif-
ference) on one side and of dead mechanism (as a passive repetition of 
an identity) on the other. Moreover, it is then possible to open to the 
consideration of multiple degrees of intensity (from a maximum of 
health towards illness), in which radical difference and straight iden-
tity must be tempered towards their mutual hybridization and their 
81 As can already be read in Aristotle: see Pierre Rodrigo. “La dynamique de l’hexis chez 
Aristote…”, pp. 19-23.
82 Kantian position is different from the Platonic expressed in Theaetetus. See Pierre Rodrigo. 
“La dynamique de l’hexis chez Aristote…”, p. 19.
83 Pierre Rodrigo. “La dynamique de l’hexis chez Aristote…”, p. 21.
84 This position can also be found in Bergson, who considers laughter as an automatism that 
reduces man to machine.
85 Clare Carlisle. On Habit, pp. 91-93.
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gradualness. This perspective increasingly imposes itself in the practi-
cal-moral sphere, in a subtle way in the three Critiques, more evidently 
in the Metaphysics of Morals (particularly in Doctrine of Virtues), and in 
a disruptive way in the Anthropology. But, furthermore, it also poses 
the problem of how preserving life, that is, of maintaining health.
Taking care of health implies to worry about the preservation of the 
life force and to sustain the constant attempt to maintain and to restore 
the forces of the human being, so that the Lebenskraft may be kept within 
the extremes of sthenia and asthenia.86 In this case too, health is not a pas-
sive state. It must be kept active, in a condition of strength,87 maintaining 
constant the interplay between increase and obstruction of life.88 If we 
focus on the third part of the Conflict of the Faculties (written in response 
to Hufeland, who asked Kant how to treat morally the human physique), 
dietetics is a set of advises and precepts to be followed so that life force 
may not exhaust or weaken due to excess or lack of stimulation. It is in 
this context, that the critical judgment on Angewohnheit is reversed, to the 
point that she is seen as something healthy. Here, the deadly identity is no 
longer referred to habit, because the harmful identity pertains the absence 
of stimuli. The habit of muscular contractions is recognized as an alterna-
tion of an excess of stasis and an excess of rupture against an affirmed 
condition. Briefly, habit consists in a rhythm built with the alternation of 
identity and difference, a self-determining force (inasmuch as desire) that 
prevents the absence but also the excess of stimulation.
The change of judgement regarding habit takes place in two steps 
then: the first consists in the recognition of habit as force (because it is a 
form of desire) that therefore cannot be restricted to a lifeless mechanical 
process that continue to present an identity; the second step consists in 
correlating this force to the vital force (Lebenskraft), which must acquire 
habits to avoid disease. Habit is formed by the alternation between the 
implementation of the habitual action and its latent state, which allows 
the prolongation of human life – whose natural interruption can only be 
given by a disease, i.e., by the exhaustion of Lebenskraft due to, once again, 
the excess or the lack of stimulation.89 In other words, habit is not the 
discontinuous set of disconnected signals, but a continuous function.
Another characteristic of habit emerges through the theme of 
health: its plasticity,90 that makes even more evident the distance from 
86 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 357.
87 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 310.
88 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 334.
89 See Immanuel Kant. The Conflict of the Faculties..., p. 316.
90 The recognition or not of the plasticity of nature is, according to Carlisle, one of the 
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a mechanical automatism. Habit is certainly a repetition of actions that 
introduces a difference in lethal identity, like doing the same walk every 
day at the same time, interrupting a workday, or consuming the same 
amount of food and water within an established frequency, interrupting 
a fasting, but this introduced difference can itself, in turn, be altered. 
Kant recognizes, in fact, that the wholesomeness of habit also consists 
in its adaptation to changing conditions: it contemplates exceptions. 
This would not be possible if habit wasn’t a continuous balance between 
a form of resistance to change and a permeability to it. As we will see 
in the next paragraph, this malleability is crucial because it opens to the 
possibility of practices aimed at changing established habits.
Habit is central in Kant’s philosophy when it comes to the necessity 
of mediating between the radical difference and monotony. It helps to 
prevent the deadly effects of excessive stimulation or total absence of it. 
Not only that, habit can be used to introduce differences within other 
established habits, such as the monotony of an established artistic style 
or the clichés of everyday life. The genial artist must have a familiarity 
with his own instruments, which is consequence of a habit of their use; 
the explosive originality of his or her talent91 is not enough. Otherwise, 
it is not possible to introduce a change in artistic styles and canons.92 
With another example, the philosopher, who must pass through the 
crisis of scepticism to be awakened from the dogmatic sleep,93 must 
have assumed daily habits – as Kant himself admits to have done (for 
example, he abstains from reflecting while eating)94 – and must have as-
sumed a “diet with regard to thinking (Diät im Denken)”.95
6. The Amphibious Nature of Habit
Free people have a character, that inserts in the daily course of life 
as an explosion and as a promise that must continually be repeated. 
Morality (contrary to the Aristotelian doctrine of hexis)96 is not 
differences between Ravaisson and Bergson. See Clare Carlisle. On Habit, p. 93.
91 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 329, Critique of Judgement..., 293.
92 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 329.
93 “I freely admit that the remembrance of David Hume was the very thing that many years 
ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to my 
researches in the field of speculative philosophy” (Immanuel Kant. Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics, in Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, p. 57).
94 See Immanuel Kant. The Conflict of the Faculties..., p. 322.
95 Immanuel Kant. The Conflict of the Faculties..., p. 322.
96 Gerhard Funke. “Gewohnheit”, p. 9 and pp. 46-66. An abridged version can be found 
in Gerhard Funke. “Hexis (habitus)”, in Joachim Ritter (ed.): Historisches Wörterbuch der 
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equivalent to a virtue that can be possessed, just as if it were possible to 
have a virtue that defines the acting subject. Kantian doctrine of moral 
is marked by a polarization (apparently) lacking in any possible media-
tion. However, the introduction of the gradual intensity of Lebenskraft 
and of habit (that sustains it) attenuate that polarity. Habit is not really 
a mechanic succession, as Kant argues at the beginning. It is not really 
equal to inertia, that, if not disturbed by an external impact, causes the 
permanence of stasis or of movement of a corps. Being a force that 
continually reproduces itself – in which its manifestation in an act fol-
lows its potential dimension and then returns to be an act – habit can 
(or better: must) always be directed and governed: dietetics cannot be 
a simple set of rules imposed once and for all, but it needs to be regu-
lated to adapt to the conditions in which it applies – age, work, change 
in physical constitution are elements that has to be taken into account 
continually to adapt the daily routine. There is no law which should 
be imposed to the object. On the contrary, there is a twofold relation-
ship in which the circumstances and the aspect of the object (i.e. the 
Lebenskraft, through the body of the individual) influence the norm 
that, in turn, manipulate its object.
Surprisingly, habit is no more criticized, but rather recognized as 
useful. In fact, it is possible to produce a habit or “to establish a lasting 
inclination apart from any maxim, through frequently repeated gratifi-
cations of that inclination”.97 The acquired habit must be managed and 
governed, through a principle of intelligence: we are far from the model 
presented by Kant about the relationship between rationality and 
practice in the short essay on Theory and Praxis. There, in fact, rational 
principles are thought of as a touchstone, to which the practice must 
always refer.98 In that case, the political rationality (represented by the 
idea of a social contract) is universal and out of time; it does not change 
according to the conditions. In case of habits, on the contrary, we are 
faced with a loss of rationality. Rather, rationality has to play a different 
role, since its goal is not to establish universal principles to adapt to; it 
is not possible to establish a good universal habit so as it is possible to 
find universal moral law dictated by reason and valid independently 
from the conditions of the subject who adopts it. Moral maxims can 
be given, but they will always be subjective – the quantity of water to 
drink every day, the food to be assimilated daily, the way we breathe 
Philosophie, pp. 1120-1123.
97 Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals..., p. 593.
98 See Immanuel Kant. On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of 
No Use in Practice, in Practical Philosophy…, p. 297.
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– cannot be worth for everybody, and furthermore they must maintain 
a malleability and an adaptability that allow to consider both particu-
lar cases and exceptions.99 On the other hand, even if it were possible 
to establish some necessary laws to maintain health – eradicating this 
way the natural causes of death –, it wouldn’t be beneficial if they were 
completely applied, as they would imply the end of civil life and the 
human existence would be entirely dedicated to self-preservation.100 
The absence of one or more imposable maxims aimed to obtain healthy 
habits makes difficult their diffusion and adoptions. These require the 
education of that desire that pushes habit to repetition. The distance 
between habit and an a priori legislative procedure dictates that a good 
habit cannot simply be instilled through the imposition of a rational 
law. The desire that constitutes the habitual force often comes into col-
lision with human rationality, since it perceives it as a heteronomous 
legislation. Imposing a law does not mean succeeding in making it de-
sirable, in inducing the will to its repetition. On the other hand, habit is 
constituted by the force of desire, i.e. the vital force, which is not placed 
in a totally other realm than that of reason: therefore, it is possible to 
have an intermediation between habit and rationality.
In Idea of a Universal History in a Cosmopolitan Aim, reason is de-
fined as the faculty of extending the rules and intentions (Absichten) 
of the use of individual forces beyond natural instincts.101 Since habit 
constitutes “a form of instinct”, as we have seen before, reason is the 
faculty that extends its laws beyond the Gewohnheit. Instinct, however, 
does not respond to law, but only to its own satisfaction. Therefore, the 
only way to counteract these impulsions is the production of habits of 
different direction. The means to produce them consists in the repeti-
tion of actions, gestures, and reflections, that gradually become more 
and more simple to carry out until they develop a Fertigkeit and a ten-
dency to their repetition, i.e., a tendency to establish a habit that con-
trasts the initial inclinations.102 For example, to stay awake until late 
hours is a bad Gewohnheit (because the imagination, free from the oc-
cupations that may entertain her during the day, wanders indiscrimi-
nately, increasing the fears and anxieties of the individual inflicting the 
forces of Gemüt)103 and the only way to contrast it is to instil, through 
99 See Immanuel Kant. The Conflict of the Faculties..., p. 321.
100 See Immanuel Kant. The Conflict of the Faculties..., p. 326.
101 See Immanuel Kant. Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, in 
Anthropology, History and Education, p. 109.
102 See Immanuel Kant. Idea for a Universal History…, pp. 109-110.
103 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 290.
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discipline (Disziplin), a habit of the opposite sense, dictated by reason. 
The introduction of a new habit is equivalent to exercise (Übung). To 
this topic, Kant devotes pages not only within his texts of practical 
philosophy, but also within the Critique of Pure Reason, as exercise is 
the only instrument capable of developing a familiarity in the use of 
judgment.104 This reflection is valid both in the cognitive and in the 
practical field: both to judge and to act accordingly to the judgment.105
Habit, if established by exercise, is fundamental for morality. Even 
when actions seem to, without actually being, conform to moral duty 
– when we assume for example a set of gestures and attentions that fit 
the appearance of morality, even if our intentions are not directed to 
moral duty itself – they help promote morality. For example, the cor-
diality among men of society expressed through formulas – which by 
widespread habit and long-term use have become effective Gebrauch106 
– that do not correspond to a real mutual respect. Or, in another ex-
ample, the kindness accomplished by respect for civil costume and 
certainly not because of respect for moral duty. In both examples, they 
spread a disposition of feeling (Gesinnung) auspicious for morality, 
although they are simple simulations of virtue.107 Adapting the human 
being to morals (gesittet machen), therefore, does not equate the suc-
cess of making it good and moral, but he or she gets disposed for it.108 
In fact, thanks to the diffusion109 of such cordial and apparently moral 
customs, the individual develops his or her attention for the possible 
purity of the will, thus gradually becoming attentive to, and conscious 
of, his or her own freedom.110
The second method to introduce into the human spirit the laws of 
pure reason consists in the exercise of judgement, through which we 
104 “Now if it wanted to show generally how on ought to subsume under these rules, i.e., 
distinguish whether something stands under them or not, this could not happen except once 
again through a rule. But just because this is a rule, it would demand another instruction for the 
power of judgment, and so it becomes clear that although the understanding is certainly capa-
ble of being instructed and equipped through rules, the power of judgment is a special talent 
that cannot be taught but only practiced” (Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 268).
105 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 306.
106 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 408.
107 This is certainly a deception, but it takes place against the deceiver par excellence (i.e. 
the inclination, Neigung). Therefore, this operation can lead to the obedience to the law. See 
Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 263.
108 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 347.
109 The problem of disseminating practices through imitation cannot be explored here. Note 
that imitation has many common elements with habit, in particular because of their shared 
ambiguity that places them both between mind and body (as it is possible to imitate both a 
gesture and a way of thinking) as well as between rational and unconscious (let see below the 
importance of the imitation of the teacher in order to assume a moral behaviour).
110 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Practical Reason..., p. 268.
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learn to judge our actions according to moral laws, until such reflec-
tions become a natural occupation. In this way we certainly create a 
second nature, and inasmuch as relating it to “nature”, it has to do with 
necessity. At the same time, however, this exercise consists in the rep-
etition of the comprehension (and of the application) of what is moral, 
and this way this comprehension gets more and more simple for the 
subject.111 Further again, virtue itself can be defined as a free Fertigkeit 
(habitus libertatis), a habit and familiarity not to produce free actions 
(it would be contradictory, since freedom collides with the subjective 
necessity of habituality), but rather to decide to act following the rep-
resentations of the law.112
The theme of exercise, however, introduces the problem of how 
to educate to morality and freedom, as these imply autonomy, which 
is uneasily compatible with the heteronomy of the precepts that the 
teacher imposes to his or her student. Pedagogy – whether moral or 
philosophical, as Kant often has the opportunity to underline – cannot 
be a simple imposition of notions, because this would mean reducing 
it to simple exercises of mechanical memory113 that, at best, can lead 
to historical knowledge,114 i.e. to an unreasoned repetition of sen-
tences, definitions, concepts.115 Again, the formation towards moral 
actions has no success, if it is thought of as the imposition of norms. 
It must instead be the production of a habit (and therefore of a de-
sire) of wanting duty as such, it must be the production of a habitual 
potentiality towards self-constraint in respect of an internal principle 
111 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Practical Reason..., pp. 267-268.
112 See Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals..., p. 535.
113 In a certainly not fortuitous parallelism with the different declinations of habit, Kant finds 
also here a gradualness in the uses of memory corresponding to a more or less narrow repe-
tition of the identical. The lowest level is mechanical repetition (intended as a literal repetition; 
see Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 292), which is followed by the ingenious memorization 
(see the example of the Haus- or Staatsdiener; Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 305), 
which also requires the use of the intellect (see Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 292), and 
finally the judicious memorization. In this case the subject reproduces the rule or precept that 
has been imparted, but he or she must also decide whether that rule is to apply in a particular 
situation experienced by the subject (see Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, pp. 292-293).
114 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 249.
115 “If I abstract from all content of cognition, objectively considered, then all cognition, con-
sidered subjectively, is either historical or rational. […] However a cognition may have been 
given originally, it is still historical for him who possesses it if he cognizes it only to the degree 
and extent that it has been given to him from elsewhere […]. Hence he who has properly 
learned a system of philosophy, e.g. the Wolffian system, although he has in his head all of the 
principles, explanations, and proofs together with the division of the entire theoretical edifice, 
and can count everything off on his fingers, still has nothing other than a complete historical 
cognition of the Wolffian philosophy […]. He has formed himself according to an alien reason, 
[…] and although objectively it was certainly a rational cognition, subjectively it is still merely 
historical” (Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason..., p. 693).
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of freedom.116 Although it may seem paradoxical, the teacher must 
stimulate in the student a desire of free self-constriction and a habit 
of submission of the Begehrungsvermögen (which constitutes life) to 
rationality. The accent is correctly put on the role of rationality that 
especially in the Critique of Practical Reason is the only faculty in play. 
But as soon as Kant asks the question of how a moral education is 
possible, it must take a step back and admit that the training of desire 
towards the application of the categorical imperative goes through 
what he had initially strenuously rejected: habit. And if desire cannot 
be imposed (because only the mechanical repetition of an act can be), 
the inclination cannot be the result of a commanded law. What ena-
bled Diogenes the Cynic to educate the son of a Cretan merchant, of 
which Kant speaks in a note to the Anthropology, is not the doctrinal 
set of norms, but the fact that he knew how to govern.117 His pedagog-
ical purpose was achieved through his own example, whose imitation 
should not consist in taking it as a model to be replicated,118 but – with 
an expression that incorporates one of the most important points of 
discussion on aesthetics in those years – must rather be an “imitation 
of its spirit”.119 The student is able to replicate a moral practice after 
having verified, thanks to the educator’s actions, the possibility to gov-
ern him- or herself,120 to behave according to duty.121 The student does 
not repeat the actions of the teacher, but generates in him- or herself 
the same potential disposition to the use of practical reason, a disposi-
tion that adapts to the context. The moral law is certainly immutable 
and universally valid, but the training towards its introduction into 
116 “virtue is not merely a self-constraint […], but also a self-constraint in accordance with a 
principle of inner freedom” (Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals..., p. 525).
117 “What can you do? What do you know?” asked the broker who had put him on the 
stand. “I know how to rule” (Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 390). This translation 
does not really fit to the original version: “Was kannst du, was verstehst du?” fragte ihn der 
Mäkler, der ihn auf eine Erhöhung gestellt hatte. “Ich verstehen zu regieren” (Immanuel Kant. 
Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, in Gesammelte Schriften. Berlin, Reimer, 1917, Vol. 
VII, p. 292). In the Metaphysics of Morals (pp. 593-595), we find some possible examples of 
the dialogues between Diogenes and his pupil.
118 See Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals..., p. 593.
119 I refer to the problem of the imitation of ancient art in modernity. The controversy was 
stimulated in particular by Winckelmann’s (on the side of classicism) and Friedrich Schlegel’s 
texts (in favour of an autonomy of modern art). On this, I may to refer to mine: Giulia Valpione. 
“Genealogie frammentarie. Tendenze e linearità della storia in Friedrich Schlegel”, Scienza & 
Politica, Vol. 30, Nº. 58, 2018, pp. 171-188, in particular p. 173-178.
120 “Two things are required for inner freedom: being one’s own master in a given case 
(animus sui compos), and ruling oneself [über sich selbst Herr zu sein] (imperium in seme-
tipsum), that is, subduing one’s affects and governing one’s passion” (Immanuel Kant. The 
Metaphysics of Morals..., p. 535).
121 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Practical Reason..., p. 268; Immanuel Kant. The 
Metaphysics of Morals..., p. 593.
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practical experience cannot simply be the imposition of rationally es-
tablished rules.
Theory can explain the functioning of the categorical imperative 
and can convince the reader, or the student, that the imperative and 
the acting according to duty (for duty as such) are the only guarantor 
of morality. The example of the teacher, moreover, can show the pos-
sibility of wanting duty as such. But exercise can also initiate to habitus 
libertatis, the Fertigkeit to self-determination through the representa-
tion of the law, and it is by means of exercise that it is possible to ani-
mate the will of duty.
As we have seen in Kant’s description of the transformation to-
wards morals, it seems that this conversion is not susceptible to media-
tion, and that it takes place suddenly. In those Kantian words there is 
no place for a preparation that could stimulate the conversion to free-
dom. This transformation is described as a jump over the chasm be-
tween two separate kingdoms. But in Anthropology and in Metaphysics 
of Morals, he tries to outline a progressive ascent, punctuated by disci-
pline122 and exercise, towards moral action. It must be possible to insert 
an intermediate between law and will, unless we accept to leave the 
introduction of freedom in humanity in the hands of a simple revela-
tion, in respect to which we can only be passive. It is possible to act in 
favour of the affirmation of freedom, but this practice cannot consist in 
imposing a further law that gives orders to the will: it wouldn’t get any 
success and would simply lead to the need for an additional law which, 
again, should mediate between herself and desire. The middle between 
the law and the free will can only be habit.
Even the superficial repetition of formulas, attitudes, and simple 
gestures of the body can contribute to the promotion of morality. In 
fact, habit marks a field that includes both procedures of Gemüt and 
actions.123 Because of the link to Lebenskraft, that pushes both to men-
tal and physical activity, Kant can therefore think that habit becomes 
an instrument to influence the intellectual faculties through the rep-
etition not only of intellectual procedures, but also of bodily gestures. 
This way he demonstrates the amphibious nature of Gewohnheit: 
122 However, discipline must be limited and must not reach monastic asceticism or self-mor-
tification (see Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals..., pp. 597-598): “the training (dis-
cipline) that a human being practices on himself can become meritorious and exemplary only 
through the cheerfulness that accompanies it” (Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals.., 
p. 598).
123 Following Packham’s analysis (Catherine Packham. Eighteenth-Century Vitalism: Bodies, 
Culture, Politics. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), the concept of Lebenskraft is at co-
re of vitalistic thought, but it undermines the mind/body duplicity even within the philosophies 
that are not part of that tradition.
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between mind and body, between freedom and necessity, Kant finds a 
space that oscillates between these two extremes. Thanks to the com-
mon denominator of mind and body, i.e. habit, even a trivial hand-
shake as a sign of respect and hospitality, stimulates the use of practical 
reason. This perspective serves not only to highlight an underestimated 
(in respect to rational freedom) topic of Kantian practical doctrine, 
but also to open new interpretations of its political philosophy. It is 
no coincidence that precisely in Anthropology – that gets the tran-
scendental gaze aside, and in which habit plays a crucial role – Kant 
puts aside the crystal clear system of the rational legal order (whose 
respect is valid only in foro externo) to deal instead with conscience 
(foro interno). To have an ordered and rational state that functions like 
a perfect machine, the compliance of established right is not enough, 
it must also take in consideration the private dimension of the con-
science. In Anthropology, Kant proposes the possibility of manipulating 
(Handhaben) individuals, to control and modify their habits so that 
they want the civil law, and not only obey to it.124 If it is not associated 
with the individual will, the external respect of the law is only superfi-
cial and uncertain.125
7. Conclusions: The Rhythm of Habit
In this article we highlighted that Kant’s critique of habit is not as 
clear as it may seem by reading certain passages, especially from the 
Critique of Practical Reason. While maintaining the distance that 
separates it from moral freedom, the Gewohnheit can also become 
free. The re-evaluation of habit in Kantian philosophy seems to be the 
consequence of a deeper awareness of the implications inherent in this 
concept, which can erroneously be considered as the simple set of re-
peated equal actions. Between the radical difference introduced by the 
sudden revolution towards freedom and the rigid identity of inertial 
motions or mechanical automatism, Kant perceives the presence of 
a force (the Lebenskraft) that is maintained as a succession of stimuli 
of opposite poles, but whose difference is enclosed in a rhythm that 
unfolds over time. Life and its identity are maintained only through 
repeated differences. And habit is a rhythm which, to repeated actions, 
124 See Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 316.
125 Following Schmitt’s texts, the distance between private and public reason is the “deadly 
germ” of those intermediate powers from which the potential destruction of the Hobbesian 
state develops. Carl Schmitt. “Die vollendete Reformation. Bemerkungen und Hinweise zu 
neuen Leviathan-Interpretationen”, Der Staat, Nº. 4, 1965, pp. 51-69.
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alternates moments when action is not actual, but only potential. The 
fact that habit does not only consist of acts, but also of the power to-
wards them, is what distinguishes it from the simple automaticity of a 
machine that is not able to develop an inclination, i.e. it does not have 
a Begehrungsvermögen.
The intermediary stage between necessity and freedom is a step 
between the blind physical laws of nature (that cannot be transgressed) 
and the adherence to duty as such. Between these poles, we find the 
constant desire that characterizes the essence of habit. Its plastic-
ity does not allow it to be degraded into the level of nature, just as 
its dependence from circumstances does not grant it the autonomy 
proper to morality: it constitutes a “second nature”. Moreover, it is not 
static and immutable, but rather plastic, driven to change by a self-
determining force, that can – or rather, has to – be governed and di-
rected. This direction and discipline of habit constitutes dietetics and, 
more generally, exercise, which are not a simple imposition of a rule, 
since they have the purpose of stimulating the will of the rule as such. 
The compliance with the moral law, in fact, if limited to foro externo, 
does not lead to morality: we must want the law; and the only way to 
stimulate this will is through the habit of respect to it or the example 
of moral action.
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